CIAO DATE: 02/2012
Volume: 2, Issue: 4
September 2011
Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan (PDF)
Joseph L'Etoile
The immediacy and severity of the security challenges in Afghanistan are driving political and military reconsideration of restrictions previously imposed upon some population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies, heretofore deemed too “risky.” Fears of warlordism and traditional Afghan factionalism are subordinated to fears of Taliban success propelled by a shadow government that has operated with more presence and immediacy within the Afghan population. Consequently, bottom-up population mobilization has become a major line of operation for the coalition, embracing community-based, constructive governance that stimulates and enables resistance to the Taliban’s malicious policies and practices. The campaign plan of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has shifted from protection of the population to enabling the population to protect itself. The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs enjoy the political support of ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; this support from the local government, however, is tenuous. Consequently, the United States must bolster support and expeditiously resource the VSO and ALP programs, and provide materiel solutions tailored to individual teams, as well as facilitate grass roots security, development, and constructive governance.
State-building: Job Creation, Investment Promotion, and the Provision of Basic Services (PDF)
Paul Collier
Low per capita income is linked to economic instability and state insecurity in postconflict societies. While domestic state capacity is the long-term goal, low-income societies emerging from conflict do not have the luxury to wait. Thus, given the current limitations of state performance, the immediate security solutions for low per capita income countries need to focus on host-government reform policies and alternatives for delivering basic services, rather than long-term state capacity-building. Even with low government capacity, certain economic policies can be put in place to improve per capita income and stimulate employment creation and other public goods. Establishing incentives for practical local economic reform policies, creating an environment that supports private economic investment, and enhancing the delivery of basic social services by the host government contribute to security and stability as they also ultimately contribute to building state capacity.
Operationalizing Anticipatory Governance (PDF)
Leon Fuerth
The United States is confronted by a new class of complex and fast-moving challenges that simultaneously engage our social, economic, and political systems. However, the U.S. Government is without an integrated foresight system, a networked approach to the management of complex priorities or a formal feedback system to help it learn from experience. The consequences of this are an increasing number of collisions with “unforeseeable events,” and economic opportunities lost to rivals who are consistently pursuing winning strategies. Anticipatory Governance would address the twin phenomena of acceleration and complexity and help identify otherwise unforeseeable events earlier in time. It is a system of institutions, rules, and norms that provide a way to use foresight, networks, and feedback to reduce risk, improve planning and operations by mobilizing the full capacities of government, and increase capacity to respond to events at earlier stages, just barely visible at the event horizons. To implement Anticipatory Governance, three adaptations are required: a procedure for developing a foresight process integrated with policymaking; a network suitable for broad-based, whole-of-government responsiveness; and a feedback system to monitor interactions between policies and consequences. The Anticipatory Governance approach could be put into place efficiently and quickly by means of Presidential authority.
Colombia: Updating the Mission? (PDF)
Carlos Ovalle
With the emergence of so-called new threats, the world’s perspective on the use of force has changed, and new challenges have developed. Alternative roles for the military have been proposed, and even new philosophies have been developed with concepts such as “population-centric warfare” and “network warfare.” All of these concepts revolve around forming a strategy of better relations with the local population and seeking a better understanding of the environment. Yet in Latin America in general and in Colombia specifically, these issues have been part of the daily life for many years, and the role of the military has long had a much broader scope than the more narrow conceptions articulated in Western civil-military relations theory. Irrespective of the present declining strength of insurgency in Colombia and the regaining of governmental authority in all the national territory, it is unlikely that in the short- or medium-term a change of role will emerge for the Colombian Armed Forces (Fuerzas Militares de Colombia). More likely, they will continue to be engaged for years to come in the effort directed against internal violence and in emergency efforts.
Reflections on the Human Terrain System During the First 4 Years (PDF)
Montgomery McFate, Steve Fondacaro
The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army program that recruits, trains, and deploys mixed military and civilian Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) that embed with military units in Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct social science research about the local population providing situational awareness to the military. HTS teams were designed to complement military intelligence and counterbalance the unit rotational policy that limits the Army’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations. Civilian members of HTTs (or Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Teams) contribute a unique nonmilitary perspective based on years of social science education and research. This civilian expert perspective promotes increased understanding of the civilian population and helps identify more effective courses of action. Despite the recent positive experiences with HTS, most of the military establishment continues to operate on the assumption that firepower and technology are the sine qua non of the military machine. Programs such as HTS are unusual and experimental, and this makes them vulnerable to the plate tectonics of the Pentagon budgetary chopping block.
Patronage versus Professionalism in New Security Institutions (PDF)
Kimberly Marten
Security sector reform of a patron/client security system often fails because policymakers lack good information about how old behavior patterns of patronage and privilege have been overcome historically and replaced with a new standard of professionalism. In patron/client systems, security is determined by how well one is personally connected to those who control the use of force, while trust between people depends on personal relationships, not on faith in seemingly abstract institutions like the rule of law. The relationship of warlords and their informal militias to state actors is based on a combination of force and patronage—in defiance of genuine state sovereignty, but with the collusion of weak states and their leaders. Warlords and informal militias not demobilized or integrated into the formal state system may become spoilers of peace or they may turn from warfighting to other patron/client activities such as organized crime. The history of and literature on state-building and security sector integration can be mined for lessons for security sector reform in patron/client systems. The promotion of literacy, education, and communications to enable the transmission of new ideas may be important mechanisms for replacing patron/client with professionally based systems.
Regional Engagement in Africa: Closing the Gap Between Strategic Ends and Ways (PDF)
Laura Varhola, Christopher Varhola
U.S. military activities require close cooperation with regional organizations and coalitions. In Africa, while Department of Defense security assistance attempts to address regional and transnational issues, the majority of security assistance programs are executed bilaterally. This approach undermines the synchronization of security assistance activities among African states and other international players. Furthermore, under existing U.S. legal authorities, little focus is given to the African Union’s development of a deployable continental peace and security force. This does not conform to guidance set forth in the National Security Strategy and National Security Presidential Directive for Sub-Saharan Africa, which stress the importance of enhancing regional capabilities such as the African Union. This article suggests ways to broaden the scope of legal authorities and security assistance mechanisms to empower African states to address and prioritize security issues within their own regional frameworks. While the case studies are drawn from Africa, the challenges of developing regionally appropriate strategies, plans, and programs have relevance throughout the U.S. military system, and are critical in enabling the United States to achieve its national security objectives in a world in which transnational issues cannot be addressed unilaterally.
NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat (PDF)
Michael Aaronson, Sverre Diessen, Yves de Kermabon, Mary Beth Long, Michael Miklaucic
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the most successful collective security arrangement among states in the 20th century. Having deterred and outlasted its primary adversary, the Soviet Union, NATO now faces the challenge of redefining its roles and purposes in the 21st century. Like all pluralist organizations, the Alliance must reflect the common interests of its 28 members, and defining common interests that motivate all members to sacrifice for the good of the whole has been difficult. In the absence of a direct common military threat, disparate interests, commitments, and visions of the transatlantic future have fragmented Alliance coherence.
COIN in Peace-building: Case Study of the 2009 Malakand Operation (PDF)
Nadeem Ahmed
The 2009 Malakand Operation remains the largest counterinsurgency undertaking in Pakistan’s history. This intervention specifically was aimed at reestablishing the writ of the state in the areas of Malakand division and creating suitable conditions for long-term peace-building in the province and adjoining tribal areas. The long-term strategy addresses extremism, state failure, and violence across vulnerable parts of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The reasons for the success of the operation and response effort were numerous, including unprecedented public and media support, political ownership, strong resolve of the government, sufficiency of military resources, adequate and timely training, coherent planning, organized structure of management and return of displaced people, community mobilization for local defense, extensive intelligence and monitoring activities, and the strong participation of the humanitarian community in the relief, early recovery, and reconstruction work. The Malakand Operation demonstrates that the process of peace-building and the creation of a better sociopolitical and legal environment can be accomplished only in close coordination with all stakeholders: military, civilian government, civil society, local population, and international partners.
The Premature Debate on CERP Effectiveness (PDF)
Michael Fischerkeller
Various studies looking at the effectiveness of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) can be characterized as incomplete and without appropriate focus for yielding analysis useful for informing public policy and decisionmaking. The proper framework for analysis should consider what effects are desired, what mechanisms of action exist for success (or failure), and what data should be captured to determine operational effectiveness. This framework was applied to the culvert-denial system projects, which presented many variables including different locations crossing district, provincial, ethnic, and tribal boundaries of varying population density. A statistical model was designed to identify the influence that such factors may have on whether installing a culvert-denial system produces the desired effect. Several statistically significant positive associations were identified between the introduction of this program and a subsequent reduction in improvised explosive device events on or near the culverts. This framework for analysis, which is typical for kinetic capabilities, should be applied to nonkinetic capabilities as well, so that programs such as CERP can be employed in the most operationally and cost effective manner.
The Future of Power (PDF)
John Coffey
In his latest book, Joseph Nye presents a comprehensive examination of the multifaceted dimensions of power and advances a framework for what he calls "liberal realism." Nye writes for the "intelligent reader" rather than an academic audience and offers a set of recommendations for a smart power strategy in the 21st century.1 Smart power, he explains, is "the combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction."